Dynamic games arise when multiple agents with differing objectives choose control inputs to a dynamic system. However, compared to single-agent control problems, the computational methods for dynamic games are relatively limited. Only very specialized dynamic games can be solved exactly, so approximation algorithms are required. In this paper, we show how to extend a recursive Newton algorithm and differential dynamic programming (DDP) to the case of full-information non-zero sum dynamic games. We show that the iterates of Newton's method and DDP are sufficiently close for DDP to inherit the quadratic convergence rate of Newton's method.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study finite-horizon, unconstrained, discrete-time dynamic games, or multistage games [1] with full information in this paper. Such games arise when multiple agents with differing objectives act upon a dynamic system. Dynamic games have many applications including pursuit-evasion [2] , active-defense [3] , [4] , economics [5] and the smart grid [6] . Despite a wide array of applications, the computational methods for dynamic games are considerably less developed than the single-agent case of optimal control [7] - [10] . The methods currently proposed solve general unconstrained nonlinear games with similar computational efficiency and convergence analysis to optimal control solvers. The complete version of this work with a thorough literature review, detailed proof and more numerical examples can be found in [11] .
A. Related Work
Though dynamic games have a long history, existing solutions methods are either restricted to specialized subproblems or directly extend methods from static games without exploiting temporal structure. Currently, no generalpurpose solution methodology akin to optimal control solvers exists for dynamic games.
1) Subclasses of Dynamic Games: Subclasses of better understood games include linear-quadratic (LQ) games [12] - [14] , zero-sum games and potential games. It is wellunderstood that when Nash equilibria exist for linearquadratic systems, and that they can be solved via coupled Riccati equations [13] , [15] , [16] . For zero-sum games, the necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium strategy based on Issac's equation are given in [15] . They are usually solved via methods that find the value functions. The work of [17] , [18] applied DDP to zerosum games with two players, which is closely connected to our methods but does not generalize to nonzero-sum games The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Minnesota, Minnesota, USA 1 dixxx047@umn.edu, 2 alampers@umn.edu directly. In a potential game, a single potential function of all strategies can be found describing every player's incremental cost given fixed policies by other players. Such problems can be solved using methods from single-agent optimal control [19] - [21] . However, the conditions for reducing a dynamic game to a potential game are quite restrictive.
2) General Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP): GNEPs are games with constraints that are coupled across the agents [22] . GNEPs can be reformulated to a variational inequality (VI) problem and solved via general VI methods [23] . Another reformulation, known as the Nikaido-Isoda relaxation algorithm (NIRA), converts the relatively hard root-finding nature of solving for a NE to an optimization problem [24] - [26] . However, the convergence conditions are very restrictive. Our proposed Newton method extends Newton's method for static VI problems to dynamic VI problems. Though the aforementioned GNEP methods can handle inequality constraints while our proposed method cannot, our proposed method exploits temporal structure to achieve significantly lower computational complexity.
3) Methods for General Dynamic Games: One standard method for an Nash equilibrium is via Pontryagin's Minimum Principle (PMP) for either continuous or discretetime problems, as recognized by the community [1] , [27] - [30] . Although the PMP allows us to analyze the existence of solution and solve for analytical solutions for a few simple games, the resulting boundary value problem (BVP) with optimization is, in general, hard to solve [1] . A more approachable reformulation of the necessary conditions is the concatenated KKT conditions of each player [1] , [22] , in which case, we arrive at a structured nonlinear programming (NLP), or feasibility problem. Though it has been known for years such necessary conditions exist for dynamic games, specialized numerical methods to solve these conditions do not exist, and generic solvers suffer from high complexity.
B. Our Contribution
We are extending game theory on the front of dynamic games by offering dedicated, practical algorithms that are proven to converge locally to open-loop Nash equilibria of unconstrained dynamic games. These methods extend Newton's method and differential dynamic programming, which are of great theoretical interest. Compared to existing methods, our algorithms have better generality or enjoy a linear complexity w.r.t. the horizon.
II. DETERMINISTIC NONLINEAR DYNAMIC GAME PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce the deterministic finitehorizon nonlinear game problem, the notation for the paper, the solution concept and convergence criterion of our proposed method.
A. Problem Formulation and Necessary Conditions
Problem 1: Nonlinear dynamic game Each player tries to minimize their own cost
Subject to dynamic constraints
(2b) Here, the state of the system at time k is denoted by x k ∈ R n x . Player n's input at time k is given by u n,k ∈ R n un . The vector of all players' actions at time k is denoted by u :,k = [u 1,k , u 2,k , . . . , u N,k ] ∈ R n u . The cost for player n at time k is c n,k (x k , u :,k ). This encodes the fact that the cost for each player can depend on the actions of all the players.
In later analysis, some other notation will be helpful. The vector player n's actions over all time is denoted by u n,: = [u n,0 , u n,1 , . . . , u n,T ] . The vector of all actions other than those of player n is denoted by u −n,: = [u 1,: , . . . , u n−1,: , u n+1,: , . . . , u N,: ] . The vector of all states is denoted by x = [x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x T ] while the vector of all inputs is given by u = [u 1,: , u N,: , . . . , u N,: ] .
Note that since the initial state is fixed and the dynamics are deterministic, the cost for each player can be expressed as a function of all actions, i.e., J n (u) eliminate the dependency on x when the dynamics are substituted. An local open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) for problem 1 is a set of inputs u such that J n (u n,: , u −n,: ) ≥ J n (u ), n = 1, 2, . . . , N
for all u n,: in a neighborhood of u n,: . When the inequality holds strictly, it is an strict local equilibrium. In this paper, we focus on computing local OLNE by solving the following necessary conditions. Problem 2: Necessary conditions
= 0. (4) Solving such necessary conditions is standard that also arises in other works [1] , [31] - [33] . The extension to feedback Nash equilibrium is studied in [11] 
B. Convergence Conditions
To guarantee convergence, we assume that J (u) satisfies the smoothness and non-degeneracy conditions required by Newton's method [34] . For smoothness, we assume that J (u) is differentiable with locally Lipschitz derivatives. For non-degeneracy, we assume that
III. STAGEWISE NEWTON METHOD
This section describes the stagewise Newton method for dynamic games of the form in Problem 1, which generalizes the centralized case of [35] . Subsection III-A gives a highlevel description of the algorithms, while Subsection III-B describes the explicit matrix calculations.
A. Algorithm Overview
Given a trajectoryū andx that satisfy the dynamics (2), the Newton step updates the input with u =ū + δ u N where the update step δ u N is given by:
This rule leads to a quadratic convergence to a root of (4) whenever
is locally Lipschitz and invertible [34] . The next two lemmas give game-theoretic interpretations of the Newton step.
Lemma 1: Given the strong convexity of each player's cost w.r.t. their own actions, i.e., ∂ 2 J n (ū) ∂ u 2 is positive definite, solving (5) is equivalent to solving the quadratic game defined by: min δ u n,:
Proof: Under the strict local equilibrium assumptions, (6) has a unique solution which is found by differentiating with respect to δ u n,: and setting the result to 0. Stacking these equations leads precisely to (5) .
The next lemma shows that (6) can be expressed as a quadratic dynamic game, whose proof can be found in [11] .
Lemma 2: The static quadratic game defined in (6) is equivalent to the dynamic game defined by: min u n,:
where the states are defined by
A k , B k and M n,k are derivatives of system equations for given trajectoryū. R k (δ x k , δ u :,k ) is a quadratic function. For details, see (11) in Section III-B.
It turns out that the Bellman equations (14) associated with problem (7) can be solved analytically and the resulting value functions have quadratic forms. The next lemma describes an explicit solution to (7) based on dynamic programming, whose proof can be found in [11] .
Lemma 3: The functions V n,k and Q n,k can be expressed as
where the matrices S n,k , Γ n,k , and Ω n,k can be computed in a backward pass. Detailed descriptions are given by (12) in Section III-B. The next lemma gives the form of the solution based on the value functions. Note that (9b) is now a quadratic game in the u :,k variables which has unique solution [15] . A sufficient condition for solvability of these games in terms of J (u) is given in the following lemma, whose proof can be found in [11] .
is invertible, the game defined by (7) has a unique solution of the form:
where K k and s k are constants found via our algorithms. The details are explained in Section III-B.
Following the policy (10) we can compute the update at x andū. Similar to Newton's method for optimization, this update should be iteratively computed until convergence.
B. Details of the Stagewise Newton Method
First, we define the following shorthand notation for first and second order derivatives of both the dynamics and cost functions, which are used in both the stagewise Newton method and DDP method.
Lemma 5: The matrices S n,k , Γ n,k , and Ω n,k in (9) are computed recursively by S n,T +1 = 0, Ω n,T +1 = 0, and
for k = T, T − 1, . . . , 0.
Proof: By construction we must have S n,T +1 = 0. Plugging (7d) and (7e) into (9b) gives the backward iteration of (12a)(12b)(12c). Since u :,k =ū :,k + δ u :,k holds by definition andū :,k is constant, the static game defined in (9b) can be solved in the δ u :,k variables. Differentiating (9b) by δ u n,k , collecting the derivatives for all players and setting them to zero leads to the necessary condition for an equilibrium:
Thus, the matrices for the equilibrium strategy are given in (12g). Plugging (10) into (9b) leads to (12h).
IV. DDP ALGORITHMS FOR DYNAMIC GAMES
This section describes the differential dynamic programming algorithm for dynamic games of the form in Problem 1. An overview is given and then the details explained.
A. Algorithm Overview
The Bellman equation recursion characterizes the equilibrium solution to the general dynamic game as
where V n,k (x k ) and Q n,k (x k , u :,k ) are the state value function and state-action value function for player n at time step k, respectively, assuming equilibrium policy is executed over all stages. The idea of the differentiable dynamic programming (DDP) is to maintain quadratic approximations of V * n,k and Q * n,k denoted byṼ n,k andQ n,k , respectively. We need some notation for our approximations. For a scalar-valued function, h(z) and δ z = z −z, we denote the quadratic approximation nearz by:
If h : R n → R m we form the quadratic approximation by stacking all of the quadratic approximations of the entries:
Let z k = [x k , u :,k ] andx k andū :,k be a trajectory of states and actions satisfying the dynamic equations (2) . The approximated Bellman recursion around this trajectory is given by: V n,T +1 (x T +1 ) = 0 (17a) Q n,k (z k ) = quad(c n,k (z k ) +Ṽ n,k+1 ( f k (z k )))z k (17b) V n,k (x k ) = min u n,kQ n,k (x k , u :,k ).
(17c)
Note that (17c) defines a static quadratic game with respect to u :,k at step k. The following lemma describes the form of solution to (17c), whose proof can be found in [11] .
Lemma 6: If
is invertible, the game defined by (17c) has a unique solution of the form: u :,k =ū :,k +K k δ x k +s k .
(18) In the notation defined above, we have that δ
is invertible for allū in a neighborhood of u . The DDP solution requires iteratively updatingx andū until convergence.
B. Details of DDP method
Using the notation from (11), (15) , (16) and z k = [x k , u :,k ] , the second-order approximations of the dynamics and cost are given by:
By constructionṼ n,k (x k ) andQ n,k (x k , u :,k ) are quadratic, so there must be matricesS n,k andΓ n,k noted with
Lemma 7: The matrices in (20) are computed recursively byS n,T +1 = 0 and: 
Proof: By construction we must haveS n,T +1 = 0. Plugging (19a) into (17b) and dropping all cubic and higher terms gives (21a)(21b). We omit the rest of the proof because it is the same as that of Lemma 5.
Remark 1: We can see that the matrices used in the recursions for both DDP and stagewise Newton's method are very similar in structure. Section V will describe how the algorithm converges to strict a Nash equilibrium if it begins sufficiently close. To ensure that the algorithm converges regardless of initial condition, a Levenberg-Marquardt style regularization can be employed [36] , [37] . V. CONVERGENCE Our main result Theorem 1 demonstrates quadratic convergence to local Nash equilibria for both methods.
Theorem 1: If u is a strict local equilibrium such that
is invertible, the stagewise Newton method and the DDP algorithm converge locally to u at a quadratic rate.
We prove Theorem 1 in this section. We assume both methods are starting from the same initial trajectoryū, i.e., ū − u = ε and ε is small. Let u N and u D be the updated action trajectories of stagewise Newton's method and DDP, respectively. Define update steps, δ u N and δ u D , by:
Additionally, we will assume that u is a strict local equilibrium with
A. Closeness Lemmas
The following lemma shows the matrices in the backward recursions are close, whose proof can be found in [11] .
Lemma 8: The matrices from the backwards recursions of DDP and the stagewise Newton method are close in the following sense: (23c) Lemma 8 shows us that the value functions are feedback policies found by two methods are close. It is not surprising that the generated updates are also close, which is described by the next lemma, whose proof can be found in [11] .
Lemma 9: The states and actions computed by DDP and Newton's method are close:
Since stagewise Newton method is equivalent to Newton's method for solving the necessary conditions (4), it naturally converges quadratically in the neighborhood [34] .
Lemma 9 implies that δ u N −δ u D = O(ε 2 ). Furthermore, the Newton step satisfies:
See [34] . The proof of quadratic convergence is completed by the following steps: 
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We demonstrate that both methods can solve general nonlinear dynamic games with proper convergence behavior. The example is implemented in Python and derivatives are computed via Tensorflow [38] . We found it necessary to regularize the quadratic game at each stage so that it is convex w.r.t. each player, i.e., Γ n,k orΓ n,k is positive definite.
We consider a simple 1-D owner-dog problem, with horizon T = 10 and initial state x :,0 = [−1, 2] where the dynamics of the owner and the dog are given respectively by
The owner cares about going to x 0,k = 1 and that the dog can stay at x 1,k = 2. The dog, however, only tries to catch up with the owner. Each player also concerns itself with the energy consumption, therefore has a term penalizing large input. Their cost functions are formulated as c 0,k (x, u) = sigmoid((x 0,k − 1) 2 ) + 40(x 1,k − 2) 2 + (u 0,k ) 2 (28a) c 1,k (x, u) = tanh 2 (x 0,k − x 1,k ) + (u 1,k ) 2 (28b) k = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 (28c)
We use a terminal cost that penalizes the owner more heavily for not reaching to their target x 0,T = 1. 
We initialize a trajectory with zero action and initial state, i.e.,ū = [0., 0., . . . , 0.] andx = [−1, 2, −1, 2, . . . , −1, 2]. We performed 300 iterations with proper regularization. Note that we started the iteration with a trajectory that is far from a local equilibrium, therefore we do not expect the updates generated by both algorithms to be close. Fig. 1 shows the solutions found via both algorithms. In order to keep the dog around x 1,k = 2, the owner needs to overshoot and then come back to x 0,T = 1. The dog learns to get closer to the owner over iterations, which is natural given how the problem is formulated. Fig. 2 shows the distances to the final equilibrium over all 300 iterations of action. As can be seen, the error reduces sub-linearly on a log scaled plot, which is evidence that the algorithms converge quadratically.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown how Newton's method and differential dynamic programming extend to dynamic games and their quadratic convergence rate. We demonstrated the performance of DDP algorithm with nonlinear dynamic games in simulation. Extending the current work to constrained dynamic game with similar generality and performance is an interesting future direction. Also of interests are stochastic dynamic games in which agents have differing, imperfect information sets.
